In 2017, the Grenfell Tower fire in London caused 72 deaths and many other injuries.

Led by Dame Judith Hackitt, an initial report in 2018 provided an independent review of UK building regulations with strong recommendations for reform.

In September, the final Phase 2 report from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry was released. This built on work done during Phase 1 of the Inquiry. It examined how the Tower came to be in the condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way it did. It detailed widespread failures which may have contributed to this.

Whilst Grenfell occurred in the UK, Australia has not been immune from significant high-rise fires involving external combustible cladding. Of particular note was the Lacrosse building fire in 2014. There have also been some significant building structural failures.

In response, the landmark Building Confidence Report (BCR) prepared by Professor Peter Shergold and lawyer Bronwyn Weir in 2018 made 24 recommendations.

All this begs the question about whether or not enough has been done to improve building fire safety.

In Australia, there have been some areas of useful action.

However, this remains a work in progress at best. More work is needed.

A Change Framework

A useful lens through which to review progress is the Change Framework. This was developed by Arup as part of their contribution to Phase 2 of the Grenfell Inquiry. This work was led by Arup’s Dr Barbara Lane, who was a key expert witnesses to the Inquiry.

The Change Framework was built to answer two questions:

• How can we create a more effective and equitable fire safety system?
• How can we rebuild trust in the built environment?

All up, the framework consists of six elements. Each of these helps to enable the built environment to respond to the questions above. The elements are depicted in the extract below from the Change Framework document.

Figure 1: Arup Six Element Change Framework

In short, the six elements are as follows:

1. A systems approach to fire safety. Fire safety is a complex ecosystem. It should be regulated and managed through a totally integrated approach. This should extend from concept design through to building occupation and operation.
2. A strong industry-wide fire safety culture. To regain public trust, the design and construction industry needs to develop a strong fire safety culture with continuous improvement. Poor practices must not be tolerated.
3. Clear standards and whole building lifecycle scrutiny. To ensure consistent compliance with all relevant fire safety requirements, prescriptive fire safety standards should be clear, unambiguous and reliable. Where designers wish to deviate from prescriptive guidance through performance-based engineering approaches, a clear design framework should be in place which must be followed. There should be strict oversight and scrutiny of fire safety provisions throughout the life cycle of a building.
4. A regulated fire safety profession. Only those who can demonstrate suitable competence and expertise should be allowed to undertake works that impact fire safety. Competency should be regulated with clearly defined responsibility and accountability across both the design and contractor teams.
5. Reducing fire risk inequity in existing buildings. In addition to new buildings, fire safety risk in existing high-rise residential buildings should be addressed over time.
6. Equitable fire safety provisions for vulnerable people. Inequitable risk levels for vulnerable people in high-rise residential buildings should not be overlooked or tolerated. Equitable fire safety solutions for vulnerable occupants for access and egress should be incorporated in statutory guidance documents.

How Does Australia Measure Up?

When compared against this framework, it becomes apparent that useful measures have been adopted across parts of Australia.

However, significant shortcomings remain.

For example:

1. Australia’s construction sector has not implemented a systems approach to fire safety.

Across many building projects in Australia, examples of holistic systems approach to fire safety from early design to handover and operation are rare and difficult to identify. On too many projects, it is the building surveyor or certifier who provides advice on the prescriptive elements for fire safety, with the fire safety engineer only considering some aspects of fire safety if requested to develop performance solutions.

On many of these projects, fire safety engineers are not commissioned to be involved beyond schematic design and design approval. Nor do they have any role in either construction inspection and commissioning or final handover.

Encouragingly, there has been a push to integrate fire safety design with other buildings elements and systems from concept to occupation in NSW.

Led by Michael Lambert and involving broad multi-disciplinary input from industry, the Construct NSW Improving Fire Safety report supported the move towards holistic design. The Design and Practitioner Act and Regulations in NSW for Class 2, 3 and 9c has further strengthened a more rigorous approach to implementation of fire safety systems.

Moving forward, it is hoped that more holistic approaches will be adopted into legislation and/or good practice in this area. New guidance is being drafted by the Society of Fire Safety. This is due for release in early 2025.

2. Australia does not have a strong culture of fire safety which extends across industry.

There appears to be little evidence of any systematic culture of fire safety awareness and commitment which extends across the nation.

Whilst some states have enacted reform, efforts across the country are patchy and inconsistent.

Again, NSW is the standout. Driven largely by former NSW Building Commissioner David Chandler and his team, there is evidence that key elements of a fire safety culture emerging which have contributed to a successive reduction of fire safety and other defects over recent years. These include:

• registered practitioners certifying and being responsible for fire safety design at the building approval and completion/handover stages of projects
• intolerance of bad practice with a tough program of building audits and requirements for remediation before occupancy permits are issued
• an emphasis on “getting it right for time”, lessons learned and practitioner training
• development and implementation of professional codes of practice; and
• ratings of building developers/contractors and removal or limits on unsatisfactory performers.

In contrast, the situation in Victoria is dire.

Conducted by Bronwyn Weir and Frances Hall, the report from the independent review of the Victorian Building Authority (VBA) highlighted multiple areas where a poor culture is evident and fire safety and other defects are common.

The review identified:

• the existence of poor building practices and a wide range of defects
• widespread unethical conduct and a failure to hold builders to account; and
• an ineffective regulatory environment.

3. There is a lack of clear standards and whole building life cycle scrutiny

Much has been written about current ambiguity surrounding codes, standards and certification in relation to cladding and other materials used in Australian buildings.

In an attempt to improve selection and performance of materials and products (including those related to fire safety) the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) is looking to develop a new Building Product Registration Scheme. If enacted, this scheme will require products to be registered with mandatory information. It will also require mandatory product labelling and traceability and evidence of suitability. Amongst other things, the aim is to increase consumer confidence in the safety and quality of products used in Australian buildings.

Beyond that, weaknesses remain in the handover of fire safety information to building owners and managers at practical completion. This is deeply concerning as such information is critical in order to enable building owners and managers to operate their building properly and safely throughout its lifetime.

Victoria, ACT and NSW each now have legislation to require provision of building manuals including fire safety requirements. However, none of these jurisdictions have yet turned this into effective regulatory requirements and common practice.

4. There are gaps in the regulation of fire safety practitioners.

A key recommendation of the BCR was for registration of fire safety practitioners – especially professional fire safety engineers – to be mandated. This approach was consistent with the Warren Centre “Professionalising Fire Safety Engineering” research reports (refer report), which provided the competencies and indicators of attainment for professional body accreditation by Engineers Australia.

Some states (Victoria, NSW, Qld and Tasmania) now have registration of fire safety engineers in their building regulations. Registration is based on qualifications, experience, continuing professional development requirements and professional body accreditation.

However, only three states (NSW, Qld and Tasmania) require fire system practitioners who design, install and maintain fire protection systems to be licensed or registered. Even in those cases, there are inconsistencies in the mix of active and passive fire systems which are covered by the schemes along with the registration/licensing requirements.

Two other elements for a regulated profession in the Change Framework are still largely missing. Regular auditing by regulators or professional bodies of all fire safety engineers and some other fire safety practitioners is not happening. As a result, very few examples of malpractice of fire safety practitioners are being identified and very few practitioners are held accountable for poor practices – except through the courts.

5. Action to reduce fire risk inequity in existing buildings is limited.

As things stand, existing buildings across Australia do not generally need to be retrospectively upgraded to current codes and standards. Furthermore, many existing buildings are not subject to regulated maintenance regimes for fire safety systems.

There are exceptions. In various state and territory regulations, buildings need to be updated to current codes and standards when they are substantially altered, extended or refurbished. Furthermore, there have been some mandatory upgrades for residential buildings. This includes mandatory requirements for smoke alarms and replacement of combustible cladding in some jurisdictions.

However, here does not appear to be any research on the fire risk of new buildings compared with existing buildings which have been constructed in past decades. Where concerns in the UK focused on high rise residential buildings with single stairs and no sprinklers, it is suspected this inequity issue is less in Australia as we have been fortunate with stronger provisions for similar residential buildings for a good number of years.

6. Equitable fire safety provisions for vulnerable people are limited.

In Australia, Section D101 of the NCC has two objectives in relation to access and egress for buildings. They are:

• provide, as far as is reasonable, people with safe, equitable and dignified access to a building; and the services and facilities within a building; and
• safeguard occupants from illness or injury while evacuating in an emergency.

While there is a Performance Requirement for access for people with a disability (D1P1) and prescriptive Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions (D4D1) there are no similar provisions for egress. It may be argued that safeguarding “occupants from illness and injury during evacuation” means safe egress for all occupants, including the disabled. However, this is problematic, and it is hard to argue that inclusive and dignified egress is being provided for all vulnerable people in Australian buildings.

Feedback from earlier ABCB consultation on disabled egress suggested the lack of Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions can result in:

• industry either formulating design solutions on a case by case in an attempt to interpret anti-discrimination laws and the level of safety required, or
• some form of justification not to include additional features, leaving the onus for egress as a function of building management practice.

All of this leaves uncertainty for developers, designers and ultimately building owners and occupants. This needs regulatory attention.

(In 2014, fire raced up the Lacrosse apartment tower, which was clad in flammable material)

Summary

Seven years ago, the Grenfell Tower fire shocked the world.

In Australia, responses have been mixed, with some jurisdictions moving ahead but others lagging behind.

As of yet, Australia has not developed a widespread safety culture or a comprehensive approach to addressing serious building fire safety concerns.

By Peter Johnson and Cameron Creamer, Arup Melbourne.

Peter Johnson is Fellow – Fire Safety Engineering at Arup

Cameron Creamer is a Senior Engineer at Arup